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COST ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC UTILITY
RELOCATION IN CALIFORNIA
Beneath the streets of every city and town in California, there is a
labyrinth of pipelines, conduits, transmission lines, and mains. Such
facilities also follow roads and highways throughout the state and
traverse the countryside. These facilities are owned and operated by
public agencies and public utilities.' As demands for service grow,
facilities must be enlarged and renewed. To expose facilities for repair
and construction, the pre-existing facilities of other public entities may
have to be relocated, removed, or altered. All of these activities present the question of the proper party to pay the costs of restoring the
affected facilities to their original configuration. Such a determination
must consider the type of conduct which creates liability, the amount
to be recovered, and who is entitled to recovery.
Neither the legislature nor the courts have reached satisfactory solutions to these issues. The determination of the issues of who must pay
and who may recover has been clouded by distinctions based on the
ownership of the public utilities involved-both the ownership of the
intruding public utility and that of the affected public utility. A public
utility may either be privately or publicly owned. This dichotomy has
added confusion and inconsistency to the determination of the allocation of the costs of relocation.
A public utility is an entity which provides a service to the public
for reasonable charges, whether such charges be in the form of taxes
or rates. This entity is distinguishable as a public utility because its
facilities are devoted to public use, thereby giving the public the right
to demand the services. 2 A privately owned public utility is normally
a stock corporation whose activities are regulated by the Public Utilities
Commission. 3 A publicly owned public utility is an entity which is
owned and operated by a political subdivision of the state. It is not
1. Many of these entities are given rights to use the streets pursuant to statute.
E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7526 (West Supp. 1971); id. §§ 7812, 7901, 10101 (West
1965). Such rights are known as statutory franchises. E.g., State v. Marin Municipal
Water Dist., 17 Cal. 2d 699, 701-02, 111 P.2d 650, 651-52 (1941). The right to use the
street may also arise from private rights, such as easements, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. County of San Mateo, 233 Cal. App. 2d 268, 271, 43 Cal. Rptr. 450, 452 (1965),
or from contractual franchises given by governmental bodies, e.g., County of Santa
Barbara v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 855 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
2. Alien v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 88-89, 175 P. 466, 474 (1918).
3. CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 23.
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subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. For purposes
of this note, examples of publicly owned public utilities include, but
are not limited to: municipal utility districts, public utility districts,
flood control districts, municipal water districts, storm drainage districts, 4 sanitation districts, community service districts, and transit districts.
This dichotomy has affected the determination of who shall pay
the cost of relocation. With regard to liability, the legislature has included provisions for the allocation of relocation costs in the enumerated powers and duties of various publicly owned special districts.5
The result is a district by district statutory liability. In so doing, the
legislature has not enacted one general relocation statute applicable to
all public utilities, regardless of ownership. Thus, privately owned publiec utilities and the majority of publicly owned public utilities are omitted from statutory liability. Such omission leaves questions of liability to the determination of the courts.
The distinction between privately owned and publicly owned public utilities has also clouded the issue of the right to recovery. Under
the relocation provisions included in the enumerated duties of various
publicly owned public utilities, the legislature has dictated that privately owned public utilities may recover.6 There is some question
as to whether publicly owned public utilities may recover under these
provisions. 7 Yet, this question has been resolved in other provisions
by the omission of the terms "public utility' 8 or the inclusion of the
terms "any. . . public district."9
When there is no statute authorizing recovery, the courts have
made the determination. Again, their decision has varied according
to the ownership of the public utility seeking recovery. A privately
owned public utility has been uniformly denied recovery,' ° unless its
The ability of a publicly
rights are derived from an easement."
4. See text accompanying notes 117-27 infra.
5. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE APp. § 73-26 (West 1968).
6. The statutory definition of "public utility" in California is couched in terms of
"corporation" and denominates a series of entities which have been traditionally privately owned. CAL. PuB. UTm. Code § 216(a) (West Supp. 1971).
7. Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5 REPORTS, REcOMMENDATIONS, AND STuDms, 85 (Cal. Law Revision Comm'n ed. 1963) [hereinafter

cited as Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity].
8.

E.g., CAL. WATER CoDE APp. § 69-7 (West 1968)

(Contra Costa County

Storm Drainage District).
9. E.g., id. § 105-6 (12) (San Diego County Flood Control District).
10. E.g., Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51
Cal. 2d 331, 333 P.2d 1 (1958).

11. E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of San Mateo, 233 Cal. App. 2d 268,
43 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1965).
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owned public utility to recover is a function of the rationale applied by
the courts. When basing their decisions in franchise, the courts have
consistently held that the publicly owned public utility must bear the
cost of its own relocation. 2 Under the temporal decisions, however,
publicly owned public utilities have been allowed to recover when their
rights were acquired prior to the rights of the intruding public utility."
Thus, there is inconsistency and confusion in the determination of the
right to recover which is perpetuated by the distinctions made between
privately owned and publicly owned public utilities.
In addition to the confusion generated by distinguishing public
utilities on the basis of ownership, the problem of cost allocation in
public utility relocations has been further muddled by the legislature's
failure to be consistent as to what conduct gives rise to liability. When
relocation provisions are included, the language has been varied to
allow for recovery of the costs of "removal, reconstruction, or relocation"'" or the costs of replacement, rehabilitation, and rearrangement' 5
or the costs of "removal or alteration."' 6 Some provisions change these
basic phrases by omitting one of the conducts for which there will be
liability. 1 7 Thus, a publicly owned public utility subject to statutory
liability may not be liable for some costs, while another publicly owned
public utility may be liable for the same conduct because of different
wording in its applicable relocation provision.
Finally, the legislature has been inconsistent in determining the
amount of recovery where statutory liability exists. The extent of liability varies from district to district. In some instances, an interfering
public utility will be liable for the entire cost of relocation under the
terms of the relocation provision.' 8 Yet, a neighboring public utility,
governed by another provision, will be liable for a lesser amount 2deter0
19
mined by deducting the value of "betterments"' or depreciation.
12.

E.g., State v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., 17 Cal. 2d 699, 111 P.2d 650

(1941).
13.

E.g., County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 182 Cal.

App. 2d 176, 5 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1960).
14. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. § 55-5(13) (West 1968) (Alameda County Flood

Control and Water Conservation District).
15.

E.g., id. § 81-3.4 (Placer County Water Agency).

16. E.g., id. § 77-25 (Santa Cruz County Flood Control and Water Conservation District).
17. E.g., id. § 47-7 (Humboldt County Flood Control District) (omission of the
term "reconstruction").
18. E.g., id. § 69-7 (Contra Costa County Storm Drainage District).
19. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28953 (West 1965) (San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit District).
20. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. § 81-3.4 (West 1968)
Agency).

(Placer County Water
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Thus, although the California legislature has recognized the need
to provide statutory solutions to the allocation of public utility relocation costs and has enacted provisions among the enumerated powers
and duties of various publicly owned special districts, it has failed to
develop a workable standard. Privately owned and many publicly
owned public utilities have been omitted from statutory liability. Relocation provisions have been incorporated into the codes haphazardly.
Language and terminology have been used inconsistently. 2 Words have
been omitted or added without regard to the consequences. 2 The result is little uniformity in the California legislation dealing with public

utility relocation. This lack of statutory uniformity varies the allocation of relocation costs from district to district and from county to
county throughout the state.
Where a relocation question arises and there are no applicable
statutory provisions, the courts must resolve the questions of liability.
Because the legislature has failed to provide a uniform resolution, the
courts have been forced to establish their own standards. 23 They too,

however, have been unsuccessful in developing a uniform solution.2 ,

This inability of current legislative measures and the courts' failure
to uniformly develop a feasible solution to the problem of utility relocation costs have resulted in a need for concise legislative action. 25
This note will examine the present state of the California law on the
problem. This examination will include a detailed analysis of the legislature's four general statutory approaches, a discussion of the consequences of the omissions and additions found in the various relocation
21. See Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 79-91. The California legislature has not been consistent in its incorporation of relocation provisions
into the statutes of one type of district. Flood control districts exemplify this inconsistency. Compare CAL. WATER CODE Ap'. § 87-3(8) (West 1968), with id. §§ 2816, 46-29, 82-3. In addition, California's attempts to make provisions for utility relocation cost allocation are not the most comprehensive in the United States. See Tnx. REv.
Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-162 to -244 (Supp. 1971). Nor are they the least comprehensive. Nine states have no relocation provisions at all: Arkansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
Also, California's attempts are not motivated, as in some other states, by the availability
of federal funds. See 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970).
22. See text accompanying notes 31-41 infra.
23. Due to the lack of legislative guidance, the courts have groped for a satisfactory basis for decision. Compare County of Santa Barbara v. United States, 269 F.
Supp. 855 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (implied obligation to relocate at own expense inherent
in franchise) with County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costra Sanitary Dist., 225
Cal. App. 2d 701, 37 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964) (time sequence in which the rights were
acquired determined allocation of relocation costs).
24. The cases have been grounded in the concepts of franchise and temporal right.
See text accompanying notes 72-108 infra.
25. Van Astyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria,44 S.CAL. L. REv. 1, 56 (1970).
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provisions, and an analysis of the inconsistencies in the decided cases.
From such information legislative action that can be taken will be recommended. Hopefully, this proposed legislation will lead to improved
planning and management by public utilities in their activities, thereby
benefitting the ratepayer and taxpayer who ultimately bear the costs
of relocation.
Cost Allocation-Statutory Law
The California legislature has enacted solutions to the problems
of allocating relocation costs of public utilities in less than half of the
statutes enumerating the powers of public utilities and public improvement districts. 2 8 Existing statutes are inconsistent as to what costs are
recoverable, 27 who may recover,2 8 and what conduct gives rise to liability for relocation costs. 2 9 An examination of the four different general
types of provisions promulgated to allocate public utility costs will in30
dicate these inconsistencies.
The First General Type of Statute and Its Variations-Recovery of the
Costs of Removal, Reconstruction, or Relocation or Less

The first, and most frequent, type of relocation provision generally provides:
The district, in exercising such power [of eminent domain], shall
in addition to damage for taking, injury, or destruction of property,
also pay the cost of removal, reconstruction, or relocation of any
26. Out of 144 statutes found throughout the California codes, 66 include a provision for relocation. However, these 66 sections for the most part pertain to specific
districts. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 98212 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District). The remaining 78 sections deal with generalized districts for
the most part. E.g., id. § 22553 (West 1965) (airport districts).
Such inconsistencies have led at least one writer to comment: "[Ilt is possible for a public
utility company in one community to receive full reimbursement for the cost of
. . . relocating . . . . In another area a few miles away, however, the same company
must bear the entire cost itself, while in still a third area it may be reimbursed for only
part of the total outlay." Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 89.
27. Compare CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 96002 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Barbara
Metropolitan Transit District) (all costs of relocation) with id. § 28953 (West 1965)
(San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District) (costs less betterments).
28. Compare CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 96002 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Barbara
Metropolitan Transit District) (any public utility) with id. § 98212 (Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District) (any public utility or public district).
29. Compare CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 96002 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Barbara
Metropolitan Transit District) (removal, reconstruction, or relocation) with CAL. WATER
CODE App. § 64-3.4 (West 1968) (Solano County Flood Control and Water Conservation District) (removal or relocation).
30. See generally, Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 80-87; Van
Alstyne, supra note 25, at 53-55.
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structure, railways, mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cables or poles
of any public utility which is required to be moved to a new location. 31

Under this type of provision, a community service, storm drainage, water
replenishment, municipal water, flood control, or transit district will be
liable for all costs of removing, reconstructing, and relocating the facilities of a public utility. The only limitation on recovery is that the fa-

cility to be moved must be the property of a public utility.32

This

general type of statute has been varied in some enactments to restrict

the type of conduct resulting in liability for relocation costs, to enlarge
the types of entities entitled to recovery, and to reduce the amount for
which the district is liable.
The first, and most common, variation from the basic statute restricts the conduct for which there is liability by limiting the district's
31. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 61610 (West 1966) (community service districts); CAL.
PUB. UTM. CODE § 25703 (West 1965) (transit districts in the counties of Alameda or
Contra Costa); id. § 40162 (West Supp. 1971) (Orange County Transit District); id.
§ 50162 (West 1965) (Stockton Metropolitan Transit District); id. § 70162 (Main
County Transit District); id. § 90402 (West Supp. 1971) (San Diego County Transit
District); id. § 96002 (Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District); CAL. PuB. UTiL.
CODE App. § 2-6.3 (West 1965) (Fresno Metropolitan Transit District); CAL. WATER
CODE § 60230 (8) (West 1966) (water replenishment districts); id. § 71693 (municipal
water districts); CAL. WATER CODE App. § 55-5(13) (West 1968) (Alameda County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 62-5(12) (Lake County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 63-5(13) (Contra Costa County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 68-5(13) (Main County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 73-26 (West Supp. 1971) (Fresno Metropolitan Flood Control District); id. § 74-5(12) (West 1968) (Santa Barbara County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 79-5 (13) (San Joaquin County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 87-3(8) (San Mateo County
Flood Control District); id. § 98-61(7) (Antelope Valley-East Kern Water Agency);
id. § 100-15(9) (West Supp. 1971) (Desert Water Agency); id. § 101-15(9) (San Gorgonio Pass Water Agency); id. § 103-15(7) (West 1968) (Upper Santa Clara Valley
Water Agency); id. § 104-11(9) (Crestline-Lake Arrowhead Water Agency); id. § 107146 (North Lake Tahoe-Truckee River Sanitation Agency); id. § 110-650 (West Supp.
1971) (Madera County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 111-5(12)
(West Supp. 1971) (Tulare County Flood Control District).
32. In California, the definition of "public utility" is broad enough to include
publicly owned public utilities: "Public utility includes every common carrier, toll bridge
corporation, pipeline corporation,. . . telephone corporation, telegraph corporation,...
wharfinger, warehouseman, and heat corporation, where the service is performed for or
the commodity delivered to the public or any portion thereof." CAL. PuB. UvnL. CODE
§ 216(a) (West Supp. 1971). The term is applicable to publicly owned public utilities.
City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 126-27,
22 Cal. Rptr. 216, 229 (1962) (Municipal airport held to be a public utility). See text
accompanying notes 134-44 infra. However, it is possible that these provisions may
be restricted to privately owned public utilities. Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 7, at 85. See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
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duty to "pay the cost of removal or relocation,"3 3 while the general
provision deals with the cost of "removal, reconstruction, or relocaIn the absence of a provision for payment of reconstruction
tion."
costs, the intruding district will still be liable for disconnecting the facilities, but it may not have to bear the cost of restoring the facilities
to their original configuration. Although it is possible to determine the
allocation of reconstruction costs by agreement or litigation, the omission may "impliedly preclude any liability for reconstruction expense."3 5
The second variation of this general type of statute enlarges the
scope of liability by excluding the terms "any public utility"3 6 or by
adding the terms "any . . .public district."' 3 7 There have been no decisions construing this type of relocation provision. Therefore, the scope
of liability is determined by the interpretation of the term "public utility." If the term is limited to privately owned public utilities, 38 its
omission would expand a district's liability to include publicly owned
utilities, as well as any other entity, regardless of ownership, whose facilities were denominated in the statute. Giving a limited interpretation
to the term "public utility" would mean that the addition of the terms
"public district" would expand the liability of the district to include
publicly owned facilities. However, if the term "public utility" is given
a broad interpretation 3 9-which includes publicly owned public utilities-this variation of the relocation provision would only expand liability to the extent that there is liability to other entities whose facilities
are among those enumerated in the provision.
33. CAL. WATER CODE App. § 47-7 (West 1968) (Humboldt County Flood Control District); id. § 49-6 (San Luis Obispo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 51-3.4 (Santa Barbara County Water Agency); id. § 52-6 (Monterey
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 60-6 (Santa Clara Flood
Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 61-6 (Napa County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District); id. § 64-3.4 (Solano County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District); id. § 66-3.4 (Sacramento County Water Agency); id. § 72-7
(Del Norte County Flood Control District); id. § 80-10 (Contra Costa County Water
Agency); id. § 83-66 (Shasta County Water Agency); id. § 96-8 (El Dorado County

Water Agency); id. § 97-14 (Mojave Water Agency); id. § 69-7 (Contra Costa County
Storm Drainage District); id. § 70-8 (San Benito County Water Conservation and Flood

Control District); id. § 110-650 (West Supp. 1971) (Madera County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District).
34.

Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 84.

35. Id.at 83.
36. CAL. WATER

CODE

App. § 69-7 (West 1968)

(Contra Costa County Storm

Drainage District); id. § 70-8 (San Benito County Water Conservation and Flood Control

District).
37.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 98212 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Cruz Metropolitan

Transit District); CAL. WATER CODE APp. § 105-6(12)

(West

County Flood Control District).
38.

See text accompanying note 32 supra.

39.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 216(a) (West Supp. 1971).

1968)

(San Diego
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The third variation of the general relocation statute seeks to limit
the amount of damages which a district must pay. Such a statute provides that a "district. . . shall. . . also pay the cost, exclusive of betterment and with credit for salvage value, of removal, reconstruction,
or relocation. ' 40 Such language adopts a restriction which is recognized
by the majority of states in defining "cost of relocation."4 1 Under the
general provision, a district would be liable for the entire cost of relocation. This variation limits the cost which must be paid to the relocating utility.
The Remaining Three General Types of Statutes
The remaining three types of general relocation statutes in California
appear less frequently. The first of these is restricted to water agen42
cies:
In lieu of compensation and damages for the taking or damaging
of any public utility facility which must be replaced by the public
utility to provide service to the public equivalent to that provided
by the facility taken or damaged, the [water] agency shall pay to
the public utility owning such facility its actual cost incurred to
replace in kind the facility so taken or damaged, less proper deductions for depreciation, together with its actual cost incurred to
rearrange or rehabilitate the facilities of such public utility not
taken or damaged but required to be
43 rearranged or rehabilitated
by reason of such taking or damaging.
40. Id. § 28953 (West 1965) (San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District);
id. § 100131 (West Supp. 1971) (Santa Clara County Transit District); CAL. PuB.
UTL. CODE App. § 3-6.6 (West Supp. 1971) (West Bay Rapid Transit Authority).
41. E.g., 23 U.S.C. § 123(c) (1970): "The term 'cost of relocation' . . . shall include the entire amount paid by such utility properly attributable to such relocation after deducting therefrom any increase in the value of the new facility and any salvage derived from the old facility." Accord, ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.130(4) (1968); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 132(b)(5) (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 338.19(1) (1968);
GA. CODE ANN. § 95-1511 (Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 306A.11 (Supp. 1971);
MD. ANN~. CODE art. 64B, § 40 (Supp. 1970); id. art. 89B, § 76 (1969); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 161.46 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 32-2415 (Supp. 1971); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 408.943(2) (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-23(E) (1962); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 24-01-41 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 366.321(1) (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 24-8.1-2 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-565 (1968); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
969b (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-8-24 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-55
(1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-17b (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.965(8)(h)
(Supp. 1971).
42. Van Alstyne, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 87.
43. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 81-3.4 (West 1968) (Placer County Water
Agency); id. § 84-3.4 (Yuba County Water Agency); id. § 85-3.4 (Mariposa County
Water Agency); id. § 86-3.4 (Sutter County Water Agency); id. § 90-7 (Nevada County
Water Agency); id. § 93-8 (Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority); id. § 95-3.4 (Amador
County Water Agency); id. § 99-3.4 (Kern County Water Agency); id. § 102-7 (Alpine County Water Agency); id. § 112-15 (9) (West Supp. 1971) (Bighorn Mountains
Water Agency); id. § 113-8 (Tuolumne County Water Agency).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

This type of statute is similar to the first general type of statute
in its application."4 Recovery is restricted to the facility of a public
utility. Therefore, the applicability of this second type of provision is
also subject to the interpretation of the term "public utility."4 5 The activities of the water agency must necessitate the replacement of part of
the public utility's facilities before there is a right to recovery. Once
replacement becomes necessary, the water agency is required to reimburse the public utility not only for the replaced facilities but also for
the rearrangement or rehabilitation of facilities that were altered to accommodate the replaced facility. Finally, this second type of statute
adopts the damage limitation of the third variation of the first type of
statute by restricting the amount of recovery to the actual cost after
deductions for depreciation. 4"
The third type of general relocation provision is found in legislation enumerating the powers of six flood control and water conservation districts:
[The district] may compel by injunction or other lawful means
the owner or owners of any bridge, trestle, wire line, viaduct, embankment or other structure which shall be intersected, traversed,
or crossed by any channel, ditch, bed of any stream, waterway,
conduit or canal, and wherever necessary in the case of existing
works or structures, to compel the removal or alteration thereof
for such purpose or purposes; provided, however, that the district
in exercising such power, shall pay the cost of removal or alteration of any such structure. 47
Public utilities are not the only beneficiaries under this type of provision. The omission of the term "public utility" is similar to the second
variation of the first type of statute. 48 The result is that any corporation or person will be reimbursed if their structures must be removed
or altered as a result of the activities of the flood control district. Thus,
this type of relocation provision is not subject to any of the limitations
in conduct, in extent of liability, or in costs experienced in the previous
types of statutes discussed.49
44. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
45. Id.
46. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
47. CAL. WATER CODE App. § 77-25 (West 1968) (Santa Cruz County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 82-3(g) (Tehama County Flood Control
and Water Conservation District); id. § 88-3(g) (Plumas County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District); id. § 89-3(g) (Siskiyou County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District); id. § 91-3(g) (Sierra County Flood Control and Water Conservation District); id. § 92-3(g) (Lassen-Modoc County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District).
48. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 31-46 supra.
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The final type of general relocation provision appears in two flood
control districtso and a flood control and water conservation district:51
In case any street, road, highway, railroad, canal, or other property subject or devoted to public use. . . becomes subject to...
interference by reason of the construction or proposed construction
. . . of the district . . . the district may acquire . . . the right
. . . to . . . interfere with such property . . . and if such right
be acquired by condemnation, the judgment may . . . direct the
district to relocate such. . . property in accordance with the plans
prescribed by the court .... 52
The provision encompasses interference with the property of all public
utilities, regardless of whether they are privately or publicly owned. Although such a provision allows for the reimbursement of relocation
costs, it is limited in its application since the rights in the property
of the public utility must be acquired by eminent domain. This becomes a significant limitation in view of the fact that in the majority
of cases the rights have been found to be acquired by police power, not
eminent domain. 53
Analysis of California statutory relocation provisions reveals that
little rational planning has gone into the problem of allocating public
utility relocation costs. The multifaceted approach may be justified if
each provision was purposely different-i.e., specially directed to the
particular needs of the area served. Such distinction would presumably be based on the function, the geographical boundaries and topography, or the population of the district. Arguably, the omission of a
particular provision may indicate the legislature's intention to differentiate one public utility or improvement district from another.5 4 However,
is it reasonable, for example, to conclude that the legislature intended
to distinguish the Madera County Flood Control and Water Conservation Agency from the Tulare County Flood Control District5 5 -two districts from neighboring counties with similar terrain and flood control
problems? Or is it more reasonable to conclude that the legislature
was using different "model" flood control and water conservation acts
when drafting the acts?
50. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 43-25 (West 1968) (San Bernardino County Flood
Control District); id. § 46-29 (Ventura County Flood Control District).
51. Id. § 110-260 (West Supp. 1971) (Madera County Flood Control and Water Conservation Agency).
52. Id. § 46-29 (West 1968) (Ventura County Flood Control District).
53. E.g., Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51
Cal. 2d 331, 335, 333 P.2d 1, 3 (1958).
54. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v, Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51 Cal.
2d at 337, 333 P.2d at 4.
55. Compare CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 110-650 (West Supp. 1969) with id. § 111-

5(12).
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The legislative history of the Madera County Flood Control and
Water Conservation Agency Act5 6 and the Tulare County Flood Control District Act 17 illustrates the use of model acts in the drafting of
flood control legislation. The Madera County act was coauthored by
Senator Howard Way and was read the first time on April 7, 1969.58
Senator Way also authored the Tulare County act, which was read the
first time on the following day, April 8, 1969." The bills as introduced contained inconsistent relocation provisions. However, no rationale for that inconsistency can be ascertained. 0 Thus, two flood control districts from neighboring counties, which have similar terrain and
flood control problems, are statutorily liable for differing conduct. This
difference was not intended but was the result of the application of two
different model flood control acts.
Statutory Guidance from Jurisdictions Other Than California
Although some states have managed to promulgate legislative solutions to the allocation of relocation costs,6 looking to other states for
guidance to cure California's dilemma is to little avail. Beyond the
area of highway construction related relocation, other states have done
little in the direction of a statutory solution. The majority of those
states that do have relocation provisions have relied on federal guidelines in order to qualify for certain federal aid.6 2 The result is a fairly
uniform statute pertaining to utility relocations necessitated by interstate
6 3
and defense highway projects.
56.
57.

Id. § 110-100 to -950.
Id. §§ 111-1 to -41.

58. FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 552, A.B. 1854, Cal. Legis., Reg.
Sess. (1969).
59. Id. at 287, S.B. 1047, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1969).
60. In a telephone conversation on November 8, 1971, Mr. Ray Whittaker of the
California Legislative Counsel stated that there is no apparent reason for the differing
language other than the use of different models.
61. Most other states have not undertaken the enactment of relocation provisions
to the extent that California has. When they have, however, they appear to have been
more comprehensive. See, e.g., TEx. RV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-162 to 244 (Supp.
1971); id. art. 969b; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-133a (1971); id. §§ 25-83a, 25-108a
(Supp. 1971).
62. 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970).
63. Such a statute typically provides: "Whenever the [highway] Commissioner
shall determine that it is necessary that any [facilities] . . . of any utility . . . to be included within any project on the Interstate system . . . should be relocated or removed .
. . [[t]he cost of such relocation or removal [after deducting any increase in value of
the new facility and any salvage value derived from the old facility] . . . shall be . . .
paid by the Commission as a part of the cost of such project." VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-55
(1970). See also, ALA. CODE tit. 23, § 39 (Supp. 1970); ALASKA STAT. § 19.25.020
(1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-126 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 132
(Supp. 1971); id. tit. 17, § 145; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 338.19(1) (1968); GA. CODE ANN.
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Arizona and New Mexico have attempted to provide general
statutes dealing with utility relocation necessitated by the activities of
another utility. Unfortunately, these statutes offer little assistance in
formulating effective guidelines. The Arizona statute is silent with
regard to the problem as it arises between two public improvement
districts or agencies or between a public improvement district or agency
and a public utility. 4 The New Mexico statute met the latter problem,
but failed to confront the questions presented by the former. 5
Other states have sought a legislative solution to the problem by
enacting statutes dealing with individual districts, similar to the practice
in California."0 But generally, these attempts have failed; primarily because legislatures have not included consistent relocation provisions in
the enabling legislation of all districts. The most comprehensive and
consistent attempt is found in Texas, where the same relocation provi07
sion is included in the denomination of the duties of each water district,
8
69
improvement district, municipal utility district, and conservation and
reclamation district 0 in the state. This type of consistency is needed

in California.
§§ 95-1509 -1511 (Supp. 1970);

HAwAiI

REv.

STAT.

§ 264-33(a)

(1968); ILL.

ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 314a34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); id. § 4-505; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 36-2963 (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 306A.10 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 175.490 (1969); id §§ 177.430, 179.265; MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 76 (1969);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 7G (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 161.46 (Supp.
1971); MONT. Rnv. CODES ANN. §§ 32-2413-2416 (Supp. 1971); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 408.943(2) (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7A-7 (Supp. 1971); id. § 40:11A-7.1
(1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-23(E) (1962); N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 10(24) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-41 (1970); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5537.05
(Page 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1205 (1969); id. § 1403; ORE. REy.
STAT. § 366.321(1) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1901 (1961); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 24-8.1-2 (1968); id. § 37-6-26 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 31-26-23 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-565 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1861a(f) (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-96 (1970); id. § 33.1-55; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 47.12.150 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-17b (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 182.36(3) (1957).
64. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-281B (Supp. 1971). This statute makes no provision for the allocation of relocation costs, leaving that determination to the Public Service Commission. It provides: "If a public service corporation . . . interferes ...
with the operation of the line, plant or system of any other public service corporation already constructed, the commission ... may ... make an order .... "
65. N.M. Laws 1963, ch. 271, § 9, repealed,N.M. Laws 1968, ch. 9, § 1.
66. Illinois, Mississippi, Maryland, and Texas have used the district by district provision.
67. E.g., TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-162 (10a) (1959) (West Central
Texas Municipal Water District).
68. E.g., id. art. 8280-167(6) (Yorks Creek Improvement District).
69. E.g., id. art. 8280-246(2) (Supp. 1965) (El Lago Municipal Utility District).
70. E.g., id. art. 8280-476(12) (Supp. 1969) (Brazoria County Conservation and
Reclamation District No. 3).
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Finally, some states have dealt with the problem of public utility
relocation by including provisions in the enumeration of the powers
and duties of certain general types of districts.71 However, these states
succumb to the problems found in California because of their failure
to be consistent or comprehensive.
Cost Allocation-Case Law
In the absence of an applicable statute the question of allocating
relocation costs must be determined by the courts.7 2 The California
decisions dealing with the problem appear to be inconsistent in their
rationale.7 " Professor Van Alstyne contends that "the actual criteria
for decision are often elusive, being obscured by conclusionary and circular reasoning in the reported court opinions. ' 74 The decisions seem
to turn on franchise,7 5 temporal considerations, 76 or a combination of
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-133a (1971) (redevelopment agencies); id. § 8194 (municipal development agencies); id. § 25-83a (Supp. 1971) (water conservation);
id. § 25-108a (flood control); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-121-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962)
(municipalities); IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-2303(b) (1970) (drainage districts); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-4756(h) (1964) (urban renewal); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, §8 55-56
(1969) (elimination of grade crossings); id. art. 43, § 420 (1971) (municipalities); id.
art. 43, § 668 (sanitary districts); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 280.342 (1967) (drainage
districts); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:14A-20 (1967) (sewage authorities); id. § 55:14A-41
(Supp. 1971) (housing authorities); id. § 40:11A-7.1 (1967) (municipalities); id. § 40:
37A-76 (county improvement authorities); id. § 58:16A-8 (1966) (flood control); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-47-9.1A (Supp. 1971) (urban renewal agencies); id. § 75-28-23(1)
(1968) (conservancy districts); OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 6121.19 (Page Supp. 1970)
(water development authority); id. § 3706.18 (Page 1971) (air quality development
authority); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1663(a) (1959) (renewal); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 969b (Supp. 1971) (municipalities); UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-20-16(10)
(Supp. 1971) (public transit districts); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-21-29 (1971) (drainage districts); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 88.67(1) (Supp. 1971) (drainage districts); id.
§ 59.965(8)(h) (county expressway and transportation).
72. Much of the California case law in the area of relocation of public utilities
deals with relocation for construction, reconstruction, improvement, and repair of highways and streets. However, the principles applied in such decisions are applicable to the
litigation between public utilities.
73. Compare County of Santa Barbara v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 855 (C.D.
Cal. 1967) with County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 225
Cal. App. 2d 701, 37 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964). Both cases involve the determination of the
rights between publicly owned public utilities maintaining facilities under roads which
the counties intended to improve. Although the results are the same, the expressed
rationale behind the respective decisions differs.
74. Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 53.
75. County of Santa Barbara v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 855, 861-62 (C.D.
Cal. 1967); East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. County of Contra Costa, 200 Cal. App. 2d
477, 479, 19 Cal. Rptr. 506, 507-08 (1962).
76. Northeast Sacramento County Sanitation Dist. v. Northridge Park County
Water Dist., 247 Cal. App. 2d 317, 318-21, 55 Cal. Rptr. 494, 495-96 (1966); County of
Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 182 Cal. App. 2d 176, 179-80, 5
Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (1960).
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both. 77 However, a careful analysis of the relatively small number of

decisions rendered by California courts relating to utility relocation
leads to a reconciliation of the seemingly inconsistent lines of decision.
The Franchise Decisions
The early California decisions are based on a franchise rationale.
Under this common law approach to relocation, the grantee of a franchise takes it subject to the right of the granting municipality or public
body to make public improvements whenever and wherever the public
interest demands. 78 The definition of the utility's franchise right is most
important to the application of this rationale.
Implicit in the franchise rationale is the need to find that the municipality or other political subdivision of the state is exercising its police
powers. 79 Such a finding requires the public body make a governmental use of the streets, as opposed to a proprietary use.80 The con-

trolling factor in the franchise decisions has become "the all-important
distinction between a governmental and a merely proprietary use."'"
An early relocation case, illustrative of the franchise decisions in
which there are no applicable cost allocation statutes, is State v. Marin
Municipal Water District.8 2 In that case a water district had installed
its water pipes under a public street pursuant to its statutory rights.8 3
77. County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 225 Cal.
App. 2d 701, 37 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964).
78.

12 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNIcIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 34.72 (3d ed.

rev. 1970).
79. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51
Cal. 2d 331, 336, 333 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1958). The court held that the authorization of the
district to "construct, maintain and operate" the drains was sufficient for it to exercise
the police power of the state. See CAL. WATE CoDE App. § 28-2 (West 1968).
80. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51 Cal.
2d 331, 333 P.2d 1 (1958); City of National City v. California Water & Tel. Co., 204
Cal. App. 2d 540, 22 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1962); East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. County
of Contra Costa, 200 Cal. App. 2d 477, 19 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1962).
81. East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. County of Contra Costa, 200 Cal. App. 2d
477, 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508 (1962). "'[P]roprietary' activities ordinarily [are]
those in which the public entity [is] in a position to spread the risk over the particular
beneficiaries of the activity through imposition of fees and charges .. .while governmental activities often [are] such that the public entity [can] not spread the risk over
the 'particular' beneficiaries and . .. [is] bound to distribute the loss over the body of
taxpayers at large, irrespective of differences in the benefits received." Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 500
(1963).
82. 17 Cal. 2d 699, 111 P.2d 651 (1941).
83. Id. at 702, 111 P.2d at 653. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10101 (West 1965):
"There is granted to every municipal corporation .. .the right to construct, operate,
and maintain water and gas pipes, mains and conduits, electric light and power lines,
telephone and telegraph lines, sewers and sewer mains. . . across, along, in, under, over,
or upon any road, street, alley, avenue, or highway. . ....
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The state had decided to use the street in its highway construction and
had ordered the water company to relocate its lines. The action was
brought to determine the nature of the water district's right and who
should bear the cost and expense of the relocation of the district's line.
The nature of that statutory right was of utmost importance in determining if the state had a duty to pay relocation costs."s
The right obtained . . .is a right . . .to construct and operate
pipe lines along the public highways . . . . Such a grant by the
state to a public utility . . .has always been considered a franchise by the courts of this state . . . . In the present case the
defendant's right of way in the state highway is . . .a franchise.8 5
This finding made the state's order proper. However, the court
also felt constrained to determine the constitutionality of the applicable
statute before the order could be sustained. Justice Traynor disposed
of this problem, speaking in terms of police power. He concluded that
the benefit which would accrue to the public as a whole outweighed the
burden placed on the water district, and the statute was, therefore, a
valid exercise of the police power.8 6 The water district was not deprived of its franchise; it was simply required to bear the expense of
removing its mains to a location consonant with public welfare. s7
Thus, police power was used as the basis for finding that the public
utility must bear the expense of relocating its facilities when they interfered with the public right to travel. This doctrine was applied again
in Airways Water Co. v. County of Los Angeles" in which the court
of appeal held that "[t]he public is entitled to the use of all the territory. . . dedicated as a public street" 9 and, therefore, the public utility
must relocate its facilities at its own expense.
The latest franchise case arising under California law was County
84. The order for relocation had been issued in accordance with Streets and
Highways Code section 680. 17 Cal. 2d at 700-01, 111 P.2d at 653. Section 680 provides as follows: "The [highway] department may require any person who has placed and
maintained any pole, pole line, pipe, pipe line, conduit, street railroad tracks, or other
structures or facilities upon any state highway . . . under . . . franchise to move the
same at his own cost and expense ....
".CAL. STs. & H'wAys CODE § 680 (West
1969).
85. 17 Cal. 2d at 703-04, 111 P.2d at 654.
86. Id. at 706, 111 P.2d at 655.
87. Id.
88. 106 Cal. App. 2d 787, 236 P.2d 199 (1951).
89. Id. at 790, 236 P.2d at 201. The privately owned public utility had been
granted easements for its mains before dedication of the streets to the county, but the
certificates of dedication contained no reservations or exceptions. Id. at 788, 236 P.2d
at 200. The presence of the easements may have produced a different result. See
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of San Mateo, 233 Cal. App. 2d 268, 43 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1965).
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of Santa Barbarav. United States.90 The federal district court held
that the United States, which had installed mains for the county flood
control district, was required to relocate the mains at its own expense.
In so holding, the court provided its interpretation of the California law:
[O]ne who accepts a franchise from a governmental body to build
water lines under or along public streets impliedly consents, as
a condition of the franchise, to pay the cost of relocating its
facilities if the public body later changes the road so as to require
such relocation. 9 1
Thus, the federal district court in interpreting California law indicated that franchise is the accepted basis for allocating the relocation
costs of public utility facilities. 9 This rationale is based on the police
power which requires the holder of the franchise to relocate at its:own
expense to make way for benefits which accrue to the public at large
by such relocation.
The Temporal Decisions
In addition to the case law finding its rationale in franchise, there
is a series of decisions founded on temporal considerations. Temporal,
in the context of relocation, means that the time sequence in which
rights were acquired is the determining factor in the allocation of
costs. Thus, it is a seniority of rights concept which disregards allocation based on priority of function and the distinction between governmental and proprietary uses.
The first case to apply the temporal rationale was County of Contra
Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District,93 wherein a sanitary
district had exercised its statutory right to lay sewer lines.9 4 The county,
acting on behalf of a flood control district, directed the sanitary district
to relocate its lines. The court determined that the solution was simple:
It is merely a situtation in which the sanitary district's right and
easement to use Grayson Creek for its sewer line was prior in time
to the95rights of the two other public bodies and therefore prior in
right.
90. 269 F. Supp. 855 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
91. Id. at 861.
92. The public utility may be reimbursed when the court finds that the utility's
rights stem from an interest other than a franchise. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of
San Mateo, 233 Cal. App. 2d 268, 43 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1965). In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the court concluded that the utility's right was in the form of an easement and that "[t]he trial court applied the proper measure of damages under the circumstances here, namely the cost of relocation of the main." Id. at 274, 43 Cal. Rptr.
at 454.
93. 182 Cal. App. 2d 176, 5 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1960).
94. See CAL. HEALTH &S. CODE § 6518 (West 1970).
95. 182 Cal. App. 2d at 178, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
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Furthermore, the court held that the sanitary district bore no resemblance to a privately owned public utility because it was a public corporation, acquiring its rights pursuant to statute. 9 Such rights were distinguishable from the rights of privately owned public utilities which
were derived under franchises requiring the utility to move its facilities
at its own expense. 97 In concluding, the court cited the memorandum
decision of the trial court:
The cost of relocation should not be borne by the taxpayers of the
County generally nor by the taxpayers of the Sanitary District,
but rather by the people resident within the Flood Control zone
benefited by the improvement. 8
In the second case, also involving Contra Costa County (Contra
Costa II), 99 the court indicated its complete abandonment of the franchise rationale and the inherent pitfalls of distinguishing between governmental and proprietary uses.
In our opinion, it is not necessary to give a precise characterization
of the right. . . whether it is a franchise or something else. Since
the two functions, highways and sewers, are governmental ones,
we need not be troubled with whatever distinctions between governmental
and proprietary functions may exist in this field of
00
law.'
Thus, the court concluded that the rights of the county and of the sanitary district were equal and " '[b]etween rights otherwise equal, the earliest is preferred.' "101 Since the district had installed its lines after the
highway was in place, the district was obligated to bear the cost of relocation of its facilities. The court's holding did not turn on franchise
but on the priority of rights based on the chronology in which the
10 2
rights were acquired.
The latest temporal decision is Northeast Sacramento County Sanitation District v. Northridge Park County Water District,1' 3 where the
extension of the sanitation district's facilities required the relocation of
the water district's water mains. The boundaries of the districts were
96. Id. at 179, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 785-86.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 179-80, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
99. County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 225 Cal. App.
2d 701, 37 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964).
100. Id. at 704, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 769. The sanitary district's mains had been installed pursuant to statutory rights. See CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 6518 (West 1970).
101. 225 Cal. App. 2d at 704, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 769. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3525
(West 1970): "Between rights otherwise equal, the earliest is preferred."
102. 225 Cal. App. 2d at 704, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 769. "It seems fair to consider that
the district took the right granted . . . [by statute], whether that right is a franchise or
not, subject to the same kind of implied obligation to relocate which exists in the franchise cases because of the senior rights of the county." (emphasis added).
103. 247 Cal. App. 2d 317, 55 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1966).
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not coterminous, and each district derived its revenues from taxes and
assessments levied upon the persons within its district. 104
Viewing Contra Costa I as analogous, the court held that there
was no priority between the functions performed by the two districts.10 5
In rejecting arguments regarding the priorities of sewers and water
mains, the appellate court stated, "It would indeed seem an absurdity
to hold that. . . lines . . . which bring the water to the home have a
lesser status than the lines which take the water away after domestic
use."'10 The result was that the sanitation district was obligated to pay
the relocation costs of the water district. "Under such circumstances
the district whose facilities are first in place should have the right to be
compensated when it is determined it has to relocate its lines."'10 7 In
adopting this temporal rationale, the court expressly rejected the franchise rationale:
[The implied obligation to relocate] is a consideration the privately-owned utility pays for the right . . .to furnish its designated services to a section of the public for which the latter pays
at rates . . . designed to afford . . . profit after deducting all
expense outlays (including the costs of relocation .. .).108
The Emerging Doctrine
Even after such express rejection the franchise rationale apparently continues to coexist with the temporal decisions and was recently
applied by the United States district court in Santa Barbara.10 9 In that
case, the district court concluded that the franchise rationale must be
applied "under California law." 0 This conclusion was reached in
spite of the recently emerged line of temporal decisions."' As a result
the case law in California is as disturbingly confused as the statutory
approach.
104. Id. at 318-19, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
105. Id. at 321, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 321, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
108. Id. at 323, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 498. In rejecting franchise, the court also provided as dictum a basis for distinguishing governmental from proprietary functions.
Whatever local government is authorized to do constitutes a function of government, and
when a municipality acts pursuant to granted authority it acts as government and not as
a private entrepreneur. Id. at 325, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 499, quoting Washington Township
v. Ridgewood Village, 26 N.J. 578, 584, 141 A.2d 308, 311 (1958).
109. County of Santa Barbara v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 855 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
110. Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
111. The California Supreme Court last ruled in a relocation case in 1958. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51 Cal. 2d 331, 333
P.2d 1 (1958). The temporal decisions all arose after 1960. There has been no ruling
by the supreme court on the temporal rationale, which has been allowed to stand in the
two latest California court relocation decisions.
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The reasons for this confusion are not confined to the presence
of an aberrant decision such as Santa Barbara. The temporal decisions
have been inconsistent within themselves. While expressly rejecting the
requirement for a determination of the exact characterization of the
public utility's right," 2 the temporal courts have had problems with
the governmental-proprietary use dichotomy. Contra Costa I did not
even discuss it; Contra Costa II applied the temporal rationale only
after the court found that both functions, sewers and roads, were governmental. 11 3 Finally, Northeast Sacramento County, which had its
roots in those two cases, held that Contra Costa I was analogous, but
went on to discuss governmental and proprietary functions anyway.1"
Thus, although the temporal rationale appears to be the emerging basis
for allocating relocation costs, confusion remains.
There is one area, however, in which there is no confusion. The
case law does distinguish between publicly owned and privately owned
public utilities."' The temporal decisions have held that there is no
priority between the functions of publicly owned utilities" 6 nor is there
priority between the functions of a public body and a publicly owned
utility." 7 This equality of functions is the basis upon which the preference for the earliest in time is founded." 8 However, privately owned
public utilities have not been placed on par with public bodies" 9 nor
with publicly owned utilities.' 21 When such litigation has occurred, the
privately owned utility has had to bear the cost of relocation. 121 The
distinction between publicly owned and privately owned public utilities
was enunciated in dictum in Northeast Sacramento County, thereby implying that the temporal rationale is not to be applied when there is
litigation between a privately owned public utility on
the one hand and
122
a publicly owned utility or public body on the other.
In spite of the lack of statutory guidance, the California courts
have apparently found a workable judicial solution to the relocation
112.
113.
114.

See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
See text accompanying note 100 supra.
See text accompanying note 105 supra.

115.

Northeast Sacramento County Sanitation Dist. v. Northridge Park County

Water Dist., 247 Cal. App. 2d 317, 323, 55 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1966).

116.
117.

Id. at 321, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
County of Contra Costa v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 225 Cal.

App. 2d 701, 704, 37 Cal. Rptr. 767, 769 (1964).
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3525 (West 1970).
119. E.g., Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 713, 329 P.2d
289 (1958).

120.

E.g., Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51

Cal. 2d 331, 333 P.2d 1 (1958).
121. Id.
122. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
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problem in the seniority of rights rationale. 2 3 Although there are still
certain problems and inconsistencies within the doctrine, it has certainly eliminated many of the problems which confounded the courts
in the earlier decisions. The determination is simple. The courts no
longer have to grapple with the nebulous and elusive distinction between proprietary and governmental uses. 1 24 Gone are the problems
associated with attempting to establish a hierarchy of uses.' 25 Also
obviated are the difficulties associated with the determination of exactly what is the utility's right to use the street or highway, thereby eliminating many of the issues litigated in the franchise cases. 12 6 However,
in the absence of a California supreme court decision or legislative
guidance embracing the seniority of rights rationale, there is the possibility of a renewal of the confusion which existed prior to the time that
the temporal rationale emerged.
Developing A General Relocation Statute
In light of the relatively small number of decisions, 127 it would
be easy to dismiss the problems involved in public utility relocation as
being insignificant in California. However, this is not the case. The
ultimate loser in the failure of the legislature and the judiciary to provide some degree of certainty to the problem of utility relocation is the
public. As taxpayers and ratepayers, the public must finance litigation caused by the absence of a statute. They must also bear the costs
28
of relocation which vary according to the whims of the legislature,
often without regard for whose benefit the improvement is made.
A consistent and uniform effort to arrive at a legislative solution
would recognize the disadvantaged position of the taxpayer and ratepayer. It would also result in the awareness by public utilities of the
rights of other public utilities. Such an awareness should encourage
better planning and management in activities which necessitate the relocation of a public utility's facility.
Considerations in Preparing a Relocation Statute
In drafting a relocation provision, it will be necessary to consider
to whom there will be a duty to pay, what conduct will result in liability, and what will be the extent of such liability. These are the areas
in which inconsistencies exist in the current California provisions. Such
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 93-108 supra.
note 100 supra.
notes 106-107 supra.
note 100 supra.
notes 72-108 supra.
notes 26-60 supra.
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inconsistencies can be eliminated through precise forumulation and
drafting.
Entities Which May Recover
The first consideration is the determination of who will be liable to
whom. The present California provisions are in some instances restrictive with regard to what entities may recover. The omission of the
term "public utility" or the inclusion of the terms "devoted to public
use" implies that, as used in the statutes, "public utility" is limited to
privately owned public utilities." 9 However, a general relocation statute should eliminate any such questions if it is to prevent litigation and
determine the duties of one utility with regard to the rights of another.
California case law has distinguished between privately owned and
publicly owned public utilities.'
Such a distinction developed from
the proprietary use-governmental use dichotomy found in the franchise
cases.' 3 ' The distinction has persisted into the recent temporal decisions
and can be found in the dictum of the Northeast Sacramento County
case.' 32 By the standards of that opinion, it is necessary to differentiate
between a privately owned and a publicly owned public utility in order
to determine a right to recovery. The implied obligation to relocate
a privately owned public
at its own expense is apparently the price that
83
utility pays for a state-sanctioned monopoly.
However, in drafting a model statute the question is whether there
is any need to distinguish between a publicly owned and privately owned
public utility. The better reasoned authorities indicate there is no justification for such a distinction. Aside from the relocation decisions, the
distinction based on ownership of public utilities has only been important in determining whether there can be constitutional regulation
Municipal corporaby the California Public Utilities Commission.'
tions are given the right to own and operate public utilities 5 which
are not subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. Conversely, privately owned utilities are subject to regulation. 3 6
The determination of whether an entity is a public utility is a ques129. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
130. E.g., Northeast Sacramento County Sanitation Dist. v. Northridge Park
County Water Dist., 247 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
131. Id.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
See CAL. CoNsr. art. XII, § 23.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10002 (West 1965); 12 E. McQILLiN, THE
LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 35.04 (3d ed. rev. 1970).
136. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 23.
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tion of law. 37 The test used by the California courts is whether there
is the dedication of property to a public use and the exaction of a reasonable rate.18 Each of these requirements will be examined in the
discussion which follows. It will also be shown that the test applied
by the courts considers the nature of the owner to be irrelevant.
What is a public utility . . . ? In its broadest sense everything
upon which man bestows labor for purposes other than those for
the benefit of his immediate family, is impressed with a public
use . . . . What differentiates all such activities from a true
public utility is this, and this only: That the devotion to public
use must be of such character that the public generally, or that
part of it which has been served and which has accepted the service, has the right to demand that that service shall be conducted,
so long as it is continued, with reasonable efficiency under reasonable charges. Public use, then, means the use by the public and
by every individual member of it, as a legal right. Such is not only
the accepted significance of the phrase by the great weight of authority3 9. . . but is the definition repeatedly announced by this
court..

Therefore, in order for an entity to be a public utility, there must be
a finding of devotion to public use and a requirement of a reasonable
rate. 140 Public utilities, regardless of ownership, fit this requirement.
Both privately owned and publicly owned public utilities are given
the right of eminent domain, a grant based on the nature of the activity,
not the ownership of the entity. 4 ' The property acquired in the exercise of this right by either is considered to be devoted to the public
use,' 42 thereby satisfying the first and most important prerequisite of
being a public utility.
The- second prerequisite for the finding that an entity is a public
utility is the limitation to exaction of a reasonable rate. Both publicly
and privately owned utilities exact payments for their services. These
payments are in the form of taxes or rates, which must be reasonable
to be lawful.' 43 What is a reasonable rate for a privately owned utility
This element of
is determined by the Public Utilities Commission."
137.
105, 126,
138.
139.
140.
348, 350
(1923).
141.
142.
143.

City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d
22 Cal. Rptr. 216, 229 (1962).
Id. at 129, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
Allen v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 88-89, 175 P. 466, 474 (1918).
Id.; accord, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Johnson, 12 Cal. 2d 583, 586, 86 P.2d
(1939); Richardson v. Railroad Comm'n, 191 Cal. 716, 720, 218 P. 418, 420
CAL.

CODE

CIV. PROC. § 1238(3) (West Supp. 1971).

Id.
CAL. PuB. UTm. CoDE § 728 (West Supp. 1971)

(rates of privately owned

public utility fixed by Public Utilities Commission); id. § 12809 (West 1965) (rates of
municipal utility districts must be reasonable).
144. Id. § 728 (West Supp. 1971).
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regulation has its counterpart in the regulatory powers inherent in the
body politic controlling the publicly owned utility.
Thus, the term "public utility" includes all utilities regardless of
ownership. Any distinction based on ownership has not been made
outside of the dicta found in the temporal decisions. Since there is no
basis for this dicta in nonrelocation decisions, a statute can be drafted
which will eliminate the unsupported distinction created by the relocation cases and remaining as a vestigial reminder of the common law rule.
A model statute should provide for recovery by "any utility" from "any
utility." Such language will avoid the confusion which could result
from attempts to distinguish the relocation dicta of the temporal decisions from the nonrelocation decisions. It would also place the costs
where they rightfully belong-on the district benefitted by the relocation.
Conduct Giving Rise to Liability
The second area of inconsistency in the current California relocation provisions is the type of conduct which will give rise to the duty
to reimburse the utility which must relocate its facilities. The most
prominent provision allows for recovery of the costs of "removal, reconstruction, or relocation." 14 5 The less frequent statutes provide for
reimbursement for costs incurred in order to "rearrange or rehabilitate"1 4 or "alter" 1417 facilities
However, these standard provisions have been varied in a number
Such an
of acts to omit recovery of the costs of "reconstruction." '
omission impliedly eliminates liability for reconnecting facilities which
were required to be disconnected temporarily due to the activities of the
intruding utility. Also, this omission does not allow for recovery for
alterations to a facility in order to accommodate the intruding utility.
this omission is not justifiable in terms of legislative inAdditionally,
14 9
tent.
Outside of California, relocation provisions variously allow recovery for the costs of "readjustment,"' 50 "rerouting,""' "altering," 1 2 or
"interference."' 5 3 Such provisions recognize the necessity to include
situations omitted by the variations of the prominent California stat145.
146.

See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.

147. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
150. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-133a (Supp. 1971).
151. E.g., TEX. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 969b (Supp. 1971).
152. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1663(c) (1959).
153. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-281B (Supp. 1971).
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ute. 54 The expansion of statutory coverage is desirable because relocation legislation must be designed to protect the public while leading
to an equitable distribution of costs. In the absence of expanded coverage, there are situations which are not reached by the language of
the statute. Such situations may require judicial intervention at the expense of the consumer and may result in an allocation of costs which
is adverse to the public, while perpetuating the possibility of inconsistent interpretations. Since the expanded coverage adopted by various
other states provides the greatest protection for the public, it is recommended that the generalized statute provide for a duty to pay when
the activities of a utility necessitate any removal, reconstruction, relocation, or alteration of the facilities of another utility.
The Extent of Liability
The final inconsistency generally found in relocation statutes has
been the extent of liability imposed. The majority of other states provide that the cost of relocation is the actual cost incurred after deducting "any increase in the value of the new facility and any salvage value
from the old facility." However, this language has been adopted only
sparingly in California. 55
This preponderance of the "betterments" approach arises from federal legislation regarding construction on the interstate system of highways.'5 0 However, this language is not limited to federally funded
highways. It is also the most frequently used provision in nonhighway
occasioned relocation statutes outside of California.
The reason for the prevalence of the "betterments" approach outside of California is that such an approach is decidedly more equitable.
[To the extent that the relocation [of the facility] resulted in
bettering existing facilities and realizing salvage value from the
superseded facility, it would seem equitable to relieve the . . . taxpayers of the burden and to require this portion of the gross expense to be assumed
by the . . . district which obtained the ad1 57
vantage thereof.
Therefore, a general relocation statute should provide that the extent of liability be limited to the cost directly attributable to relocation
less deductions for betterments and salvage. In this way only will relocation costs be equitably allocated.
A Proposed Relocation Statute
Having considered to whom there will be a duty to pay, what con154.
155.
156.
157.

See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970). See text accompanying notes 41, 62-63 supra.
Van Alstyne, supra note 81, at 502.
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duct will create liability, and what will be the extent of such liability,
the following relocation statute is proposed:
In the event that in the exercise of its powers a utility shall require
the removal, reconstruction, alteration, or relocation of any structure, railways, mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cables, poles or any
other facility of any other utility, the utility requiring such removal,
reconstruction, alteration, or relocation shall bear the costs and
expenses thereof. The costs and expense payable shall be the
total costs properly attributable to such removal, reconstruction,
alteration, or relocation less deductions therefrom of any increase
in the value of the new facility and any salvage value derived
from the old facility.
Such a statute would provide a rationally consistent and uniform solution to the problems of allocating the costs of public utility relocation
in California.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the California legislature has recognized
the need to provide statutory solutions to the problem of the allocation
of public utility relocation costs. The solution, however, has only generated confusion by not dealing with all public utilities, by using a fiveprong approach to liability, and by varying the language of the provisions without reason. California is not unique. Most other jurisdictions have also failed to create satisfactory statutory solutions.
In light of the confusion produced by California's haphazard and
inconsistent legislative provisions, the courts have grappled with the
problem of cost allocation in public utility relocations. They have allowed the temporal and franchise rationales to coexist, thereby adding
to the confusion. The cases have distinguished between privately
owned and publicly owned public utilities. Such a distinction is not
found outside the area of public utility relocation. The result is an
emerging seniority of rights doctrine which has not been firmly entrenched by either the courts or the legislature.
The unsatisfactory state of the statutory provisions and the decided cases requires the enactment of a single relocation statute to remove the existing confusion and the possibility of future litigation.
Through analysis of the provisions for cost allocation, both within and
without California, this note has developed a general relocation statute
for consideration by the legislature. The proposed statute obviates the
questions which have arisen as to who may recover, what conduct gives
rise to liability, and what is the extent of recovery. This has been
accomplished while eliminating any distinctions based on the ownership
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of the public utility. The result is a general statute designed to make
California a front runner in successfully dealing with the problem of
cost allocation in public utility relocations.
William P. Torngren*
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